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Marshall Wolfe * 
The author has asserted in earlier papers 
that the broad pronouncements made by 
international organizations -suggesting 
what must be done without mentioning 
who is to do it how and when—, the 
dissemination of 'practical' techniques 
and the execution of 'pilot projects' have 
been of very little use in orienting the 
Latin American countries, because they 
are too general or too piecemeal, because 
they are ill adapted to the realities of the 
technical and economic situation, because 
they are not politically viable, etc. To 
avoid such mistakes he does not put 
forward his proposals as universal pan-
aceas, but as criteria, ideas or guidelines 
relating to some of the vital issues with 
which Latin America's national societies 
will have to cope, if, as may plausibly be 
supposed, their future scenario turns out 
to be full of complex mutations. 
The preconditions once established, 
he classifies his proposals under four 
heads. In principle, he accords priority to 
questions connected with the satisfaction 
of basic needs, i.e., the national-scale 
production, distribution and consump-
tion of goods and services regarded in 
that light; he then propounds certain 
theses on employment, stressing in par-
ticular that it should not be interpreted 
merely as a source of production and 
income, but also in its broad psycho-
social significance, as a basis for possible 
'meaningful human activities'. Next he 
goes into the subject of participation and 
the distribution of power at the national 
level, and the article culminates in a 
discussion of international relations prob-
lems linked to the idea of self-reliance. 




The present text follows upon papers 
that have pointed to contradictions in 
the images of the human future in recent 
declarations on development and specu-
lated on the reasons for such contradic-
tions; that have described 'seeds of 
change' in different types of national 
societies which affect the likelihood of a 
coherent response to the concerns under-
lying the declarations; and that have 
discussed the case for 'critical poverty' as 
the central policy focus for 'another 
development' . ' 
The author has thus far evaded the 
challenge to propose a more adequate 
focus for development policies capable 
of realizing the hopes that have been 
invested in 'another development'. The 
preceding papers exposed his inability 
to escape from scepticism concerning the 
relevance of prescriptions addressed to 
humanity at large or governments in 
general by the international bureaucratic 
and academic machinery that continu-
ally generates meetings and reports and 
missions around the elusive topic of 
'development'. The thorniest problem is 
not the formulation of better strategies 
for human-oriented development. The 
efforts of dedicated thinkers over the 
past two centuries seem to have un-
covered all conceivable solutions; some 
1
 "The concrete utopias and their confron-
tation with the world of today" (CEPAL/ 
DRAFT/DS/134, March 1976), and "Poverty as 
a social phenomenon and as a central issue for 
development policy" (CEPAL/DRAFT/DS/ 
133, May 1976). The term 'another develop-
ment' is borrowed from What now? Another 
development, in the 1975 Dag Hammarskjôld 
Report on development and international co-
operation, Upsala, Sweden, 1975. 
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of these solutions have been tested in 
practice; and some of them have helped 
to change the course of history. The 
institutionalized continuation of these 
efforts today continually rediscovers, 
without acknowledgement or even 
awareness, ideas current among Utopian 
socialists of the early 19th century or 
late-19th-century Russian populists. The 
would-be architects of ideal societies 
have commonly envisaged social change 
processes as more manipulable and less 
ambiguous in their consequences than 
has been the case. While their influence 
has been very great and has undergone 
surprising metamorphoses, they have 
failed to identify and 'conscientize' 
social forces willing and able to apply 
strategies oriented to human welfare 
coherently, realistically, and flexibly 
over the long term. 
A. sympathetic study of the experi-
ences of political leaders and planners 
who have tried to apply coherent strate-
gies to their own national setting con-
duces to humility, and even suggests that 
the last thing they need is more general-
ized advice couched in catchwords, such 
as the 'unified approach to develop-
ment', on what they ought to do if they 
could count on an ideal social consensus 
and an ideal capacity to acquire and 
digest information.2 The 'high-level 
expert' who pontificates on what must 
be done and evades the questions who 
and how is justifiably becoming a figure 
of fun. At the other extreme, the pur-
veying in international reports of 
shopping lists of 'practical' techniques 
and 'pilot projects', on the supposition 
2
 A good many studies, some by active 
participants, of the real vicissitudes of develop-
ment policy-making are now available. Two 
books published by the Latin American Insti-
tute for Economic and Social Planning (Institu-
that policy makers can pick and choose 
from sketchy descriptions of what has 
allegedly succeeded elsewhere, is also 
reaching a dead end of futility. The 
situation of the real participants in 
policy-making is generally closer to that 
of Alice in her Wonderland croquet game 
than to that of the powerful, benevolent, 
unimaginative entities to which develop-
ment prescriptions seem to be addressed.3 
Some of the propositions now 
competing for attention in the utopias 
devised by committees are more prom-
ising than others, not as ready-made 
prescriptions but as criteria against 
which policies can be assessed, ideas 
promising a certain capacity to penetrate 
public opinion and help to modify domi-
nant values, and signposts to paths that 
national societies may not be able to 
avoid entering upon, / / the future evolves 
along certain lines that seem at least as 
plausible as the alternatives. 
This last point deserves emphasis. If 
the international economic order re-
covers its previous dynamism, if the 
present centres retain their hegemony 
and use it for the same purposes as 
heretofore, if the contradictions gener-
ic Latinoamericano de Planificación Económica 
y Social - ILPES) in 1972 (Carlos Matus, Estra-
tegia y plan, and Sergio Molina, El proceso de 
cambio en Chile, both Editorial Universitaria, 
Santiago, Chile, 1972) and the more recent 
ILPES papers on Estado y planificación are 
particularly relevant. 
3
 "Alice thought she had never seen such a 
curious croquet-ground in her life; it was all 
ridges and furrows; the croquet balls were live 
hedgehogs, and the mallets live flamingoes, and 
the soldiers had to double themselves up and 
stand on their hands and feet to make the 
arches. . . . Alice soon came to the conclusion 
that it was a very difficult game indeed. The 
players all played at once without waiting for 
turns, quarrelling all the while, and fighting for 
the hedgehogs...." 
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ated by present styles of development in 
semi-developed peripheral national soci-
eties such as those of Latin America 
continue to be manageable in one way or 
another, such propositions can, at most, 
be received by the dominant forces as 
'missing ingredients' to be added to the 
style of development in order to make it 
function better, or to forestall criticisms 
of its inequity, with the likely result of 
introducing secondary contradictions 
and anomalies in its functioning. If the 
medium-term future should bring catas-
trophic breakdown in the international 
order, we have no way of offering 
rational guidelines to the societies as to 
how to cope, or even of forecasting what 
social forces would become dominant in 
these societies. 
The following pages will discuss the 
relevance of certain propositions on the 
supposition that the medium-term future 
will be one of frequent and continually 
changing crises not amounting to catas-
trophe, of contradictory stimuli from 
the world centres and waning capacity of 
the centres to exercise hegemony, of 
challenges for which neither the forces 
dominating present governments nor the 
counter-elites are prepared. In the short 
term, one can expect successive waves of 
frantic urgency for action subsiding into 
complacency at any sign of return to the 
'normal'. Measures taken piecemeal to 
cope with disbenefits of styles of develop-
ment will cumulatively change the charac-
ter of the styles, for better or worse. 
State interventions in the society will 
become more pervasive, but not neces-
sarily more coherent, and these interven-
tions will interact with the changing 
demands and values of social forces, and 
with changing forms of alienation from 
and resistance to the State. 
Certain propositions from current 
discussions of 'another development' 
may gain political viability through les-
sons of experience demonstrating their 
necessity for human survival, and 
through changes in values, social rela-
tionships, and power structures that can 
accord them effective priority over 
incompatible social demands.4 
The propositions in question refer to 
the meeting of basic human needs, self-
reliance, participation, and a theme 
recurring in discussions of 'another 
development' but not yet endowed with 
a uniform label: it will here be called 
'meaningful human activity', that is, 
actively meaningful to the individual as 
well as contributory to the society's 
evolution toward 'another development'. 
All of these propositions can be treated 
as 'missing ingredients' in current styles 
4
 The future here envisaged corresponds to 
the scenario of 'competitive détente' described 
by José Medina Echavarria in "Latin America 
in the possible scenarios of détente" {CEPAL 
Review, N° 2,secondhalf of 1976), butsupposes 
a greater loss of control by the two hegemonic 
powers, for internal and external reasons, and 
more freedom of action by the peripheral 
societies, without, however, the emergence of a 
coherent 'new international economic order'. 
The concept of 'mutation' instead of 'crisis', 
introduced in a recent article by Alain 
Touraine, helps to clarify the approach pro-
posed here. In his view, a study conducted in 
terms of crisis leads up to recourse to a rescue 
plan for the planet envisaged as a vast social 
system, at the core of which a central authori-
ty, or, more simply, a coherent will, could 
propose reasonable solutions, beneficial, that is, 
for mankind as a whole, and at the same time 
technically feasible. When people shout 
"Fire! ", it means that they expect the firemen 
to come.. . Conversely, to speak of mutation 
brings to the fore cultural changes and changes 
in social relations, particularly power relations; 
and this is meaningful only within real social 
systems, i.e., systems defined by institutions 
and powers. (See Alain Touraine, "Crise ou 
mutation? " in Au-delà de la Crise, Paris, 
Editions du Seuil, 1976, pp. 24-25.) 
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of development, but if the future 
assumes approximately the traits sug-
gested above, their unavoidability on the 
one hand and their incompatibility with 
certain other objectives and with prevail-
ing life-styles on the other will become 
more evident. The discussion of'seeds of 
change' in an earlier paper suggested 
some of the ways in which this is 
beginning to happen. The future may 
then depend on the extent to which 
emerging forces in human societies can 
realistically and rationally evolve new 
life-styles summed up by the four propo-
sitions, accepting the sacrifices and 
making creative use of the opportunities 
they imply, and keeping under control 
the drives incompatible with such an 
evolution. It is possible that human 
societies will prove so wedded to present 
life-styles that they will perish rather 
This proposition has the virtue of di-
recting attention equally to production, 
to consumption (as the main legitimate 
reason for wanting higher production), 
and to distribution (as the provision of 
relevant 'basic' goods and services to all). 
It points to the elimination of critical 
poverty without singling out the poor as 
a category to be 'helped'. By itself, it has 
the disadvantage of being uninspiringly 
utilitarian. The meeting of basic needs 
does not constitute an image of the 
future society adequate to inspire the 
enormous effort, including the effort of 
self-restraint and social discipline, that is 
called for, any more than does the more 
elaborate lure of consumerism. Man does 
than undertake their transformation. It 
is also possible, unfortunately, that they 
will find no means of doing so which will 
not incur such heavy costs - in failed 
experimentation, substitution of facade 
achievements and rituals for real achieve-
ments, chronic conflict and mutual sabo-
tage between groups trying to impose 
their own will, regimentation and manip-
ulation of consensus— that 'another 
development' will satisfy the hopes in-
vested in it no better than the styles now 
prevailing have done. Part of the case for 
the four propositions listed above is that, 
taken together, they point to caution in 
social engineering. Even if a portion of a 
national society should achieve the 
power to fit the whole society to a bed 
of Procrustes, the exercising of such 
power is not the most promising way to 
'another development'. 
not live by bread alone. The symptoms 
of crisis, or breakdown in most national 
societies today derive as much from the 
failure of these societies to afford partic-
ipation in meaningful activity as from 
their failure to satisfy basic needs for 
goods and services. 
For present purposes, the essential 
element in a definition of 'basic needs' is 
that the term refers to the goods and 
services that can be produced and dis-
tributed to the whole of a national 
population, in accordance with realistic 
expectations, independently of the 
achievement of a more equitable world 
order. This does not mean autarky at the 
national level; all national societies will 
2. 
Priority for the meeting of basic 
human needs 
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have to satisfy part of their basic needs 
through exchange of products for which 
they. have comparative advantages, and 
the smaller the national population the 
larger this proportion will be. However, a 
basic needs strategy would presumably 
mean a smaller role for international 
trade than at present. 
The national definition must respond 
to an objective criterion for 'basic' (e.g., 
meeting minimum physiological needs) 
and also to the subjective criteria of the 
people whose basic needs are in ques-
tion. It is important to avoid the trap of 
making definition and measurement of 
basic needs ends in themselves, and also 
the temptation to admit as 'basic needs' 
the whole range of desiderata that have 
received international recognition as 
'human rights'. A 'right' is meaningful 
only to the extent that a national society 
is really capable of honouring it for all 
its members; otherwise, insistence on 
rights unavoidably becomes a tactic for 
the protection and extension of minority 
privileges. This point is particularly 
important for societies such as those of 
Latin America, in which different strata 
of the national population have quite 
different norms for basic needs, and in 
which the strata with relatively elaborate 
norms have greater power than the 
others to impose their conceptions on 
public policies. 
Moreover, it cannot be taken for 
granted that conventional goods and 
services and conventional systems for 
their provision constitute the only means 
or the most efficient means of meeting 
the basic need to which they are addres-
sed. This problem manifests itself differ-
ently in relation*to each need and calls 
for examination of the widest possible 
range of alternatives. The prior fixing of 
quantitative targets (e.g. number of 
years of formal education) may cramp 
the search for better alternatives. In the 
case of education, for example, it now 
seems probable that concentration on 
the social purposes of education within 
societies having the overall priorities 
summed up in 'another development' 
will sharply diminish the relevance of the 
conventional norms, which can be satis-
fied by herding all children for a given 
number of days and years into buildings 
labelled 'schools'. As regards transport, 
within present urban patterns, a consid-
erable expansion of cheap public trans-
port is a real basic need to be preferred 
to the proliferation of private automo-
biles; but a transformation of the urban 
patterns might remove most of the need 
by bringing places of work within 
walking distance of homes.5 The shift in 
national priorities and popular expecta-
tions implied by an authentic basic needs 
strategy is so extensive and so potential-
ly traumatic to the 'modernized' sectors 
of the population that such a ques-
tioning of conventional solutions and 
search for alternatives might reduce 
rather than intensify the political diffi-
culties. It would widen the possibilities 
for popular participation and introduce 
an element of creativity counteracting 
the drab uniformity that might other-
wise come to dominate such an ap-
proach. Ideally, it should make eco-
nomic costs more manageable while per-
mitting a more generous and inspiring 
conception of basic needs. At the same 
sIvan Illich and the Centro Intercultural de 
Documentación (CiDOC) in Cuernavaca, Mexi-
co, have done some of the most stimulating 
thinking on alternatives, although the alterna-
tives proposed are sometimes simplistic. See 
Ivan Illich, Deschooling Society, New York, 
Harper & Row, 1973; Energy and Equity, 
London, Calder and Boyers, Ltd., 1973; and 
Tools for Conviviality, New York, Harper & 
Row, 1973. 
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time, it would unavoidably complicate 
the planning and administrative prob-
lems; the opening-up of alternatives is a 
frightening prospect for bureaucratic 
institutions wedded to standardized pro-
cedures, and the capacity of the public 
to embrace new ways of thinking about 
needs is an unknown quantity.6 These 
considerations lead back to the essential 
complementary roles of meaningful 
activity, participation, self-reliance, to be 
discussed below. 
Since the conception of'basic needs' 
advocated here is governed by national 
capacities rather than universal stan-
dards, the relevant short-term standards 
for some national societies may have to 
be meagre indeed, but in Latin America 
the norm can be well above the 'rock-
bottom level of physical existence' re-
ferred to in the 1975 Dag Hammarskjôld 
Report.7 Under these circumstances, a 
basic needs strategy does not require 
strictly egalitarian distribution -the poli-
tical and economic costs, if they could 
6
 See Win Crowther, "The search for rele-
vance: political ideology, culture .and political 
choice as factors of technological development 
and dependence in Latin America" (CEPAL, 
draft, 27 January 1976), for some challenging 
propositions on the need for and feasibility of a 
replacement of routines by creative problem-
solving. 
7
 In reproducing a suggestion for India of 
an initial target of a daily income per working 
adult equivalent to 3 kg. of cereals in rural areas 
and 4.5 kg. in urban areas. (What Now? 
Another Development, op. cit., p. 42.) The 
recent report of the Director-General of the 
International Labour Office, Employment, 
Growth and Basic Needs: A One-World Problem 
(ILO, Geneva, 1976) presents an acceptable 
classification of basic needs and emphasizes, 
first, that "basic needs constitute the minimum 
objective of society, not the full range of 
desirable attributes. . . "; secondly, that "basic 
needs can be relative as well as absolute" 
(p. 33). 
be met at all, would outweigh the 
benefits, and the implied regimentation 
would be a major disbenefit in itself. But 
such a strategy does imply that public 
policy, to the extent that it controls the 
relevant factors and has mobilized suffi-
cient understanding and support, should 
restrict the satisfaction of non-basic 
wants that conflict with the satisfaction 
of nationally defined basic needs and 
with the kind as well as the amount of 
capital accumulation required to en-
hance their satisfaction in the future. 
The relevant policy instruments would 
include differential taxation to discour-
age some forms of consumption, sub-
sidies to other forms of consumption, 
restriction of non-essential imports, con-
trols on commercial publicity, and 
others that come readily to mind. The 
effectiveness of these instruments —most 
of which have been resorted to for one 
reason or another even within current 
'consumerist' styles of development-
would depend on simultaneous changes 
in the values, expectations, and partici-
patory capacities of different social 
strata, probably under the impact of 
crises demonstrating the non-viability of 
previous expectations. 
The proportion of national income de-
voted to investment within a basic needs 
strategy might or might not be higher than 
before. Priority for the meeting of basic 
needs cannot logically be denied through 
a generalized plea for higher rates of 
accumulation, since the destinations of a 
large part of previous 'productive' invest-
ment, and also of infrastructural and 
even social investment, would become 
irrelevant or worse. It goes without 
saying that the need for accumulation 
will remain and that this will warrant 
austerity in the definition of basic needs 
for many years to come. However, the 
dominant forces in the national societies 
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will be justified in calling for austerity 
mainly in so far as they can demonstrate 
that accumulation will, in fact, enhance 
the capacity to meet basic needs in 
preference to other ends. 
Other things being equal, one might 
suppose that the conversion of the 
general proposition on basic needs into a 
politically and economically viable 
strategy would become more feasible to 
the extent that: 
(a) Existing national productive capacity 
is sufficient and the nature of the 
main products is such that a level of 
living can be afforded to all which is 
not so meagre that the population 
puts up with it only as far as it cannot 
help doing so —like the 'critically 
poor' at present; 
(b) National planning and administrative 
mechanisms, are sufficiently well-
developed, and the State has suffi-
cient legitimacy, for State and so-
ciety to be able to find practicable 
means of ensuring that basic needs 
have priority; 
(c) The life styles and expectations of 
the population are sufficiently 
homogeneous to imply that realistic 
basic minima for the whole popula-
tion would not come into unmanage-
able conflict with the demands of 
sizable minorities having specific 
conceptions of their own basic 
needs. 
The real processes of dependent eco-
nomic growth and social change in the 
Third World up to the present make it 
ingenuous to expect that all three of 
these conditions will be favourable to a 
basic needs strategy in any one national 
society. To the extent that productive 
and administrative capacity is favourable 
and the State enjoys wide recognition as 
the legitimate formulator of national 
goals, the social differentiation of the 
population increases and the groups that 
stand to lose in the short term by a basic 
needs strategy become larger and more 
articulate. Low levels of per capita in-
come do not rule out a basic needs 
strategy if social solidarity is present and 
the States has a certain mobilizing 
capacity. China has demonstrated how 
much can be done under these circum-
stances, but also how traumatic are the 
historical processes that may make the 
doing possible. Sri Lanka, with a na-
tional system of subsidized or free rice 
distribution in effect most of the time 
since the 1940s, and with relatively 
well-developed educational and other so-
cial services, has also demonstrated the 
feasibility of a basic needs strategy at a 
per capita GNP level well below that of 
any Latin American country.8 The Sri 
Lanka policy seems to have entered into 
crisis not because of inability to afford 
the rice distribution and the social ser-
vices, but because of inability to incor-
porate these into a coherent alternative 
style of development affording incen-
tives to productivity and meaningful 
activity for the educated youth.9 
A basic needs strategy should be-
come more feasible to the extent that 
production is already oriented towards 
8
 According to the World Bank A Has 1974, 
the per capita GNP of Sri Lanka in 1973 was 
120 dollars; in Latin America in the same year, 
only two countries fell below 300 dollars, and 
most were at much higher levels. 
9
". . . the package of welfare policies was 
anti-growth and anti-development not so much 
because it competed with the development 
programme for scarce capital, but because it 
removed the incentives for growth and develop-
ment in the very sectors in which investments 
were being made." United Nations Research 
Institute for Social Development (UNRISn), 
"Case Study: Sri Lanka (Ceylon)", Marga Insti-
tute, October 1972. 
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staple foods, clothing, simple construc-
tion materials, and other mass-consump-
tion goods, and services towards elemen-
tary education and basic health care at 
low unit costs. If production is oriented 
towards minerals or agricultural products 
for export, and if the State is able to 
capture a major part of the proceeds, 
this may also favour a basic needs 
strategy —depending on the character of 
the forces dominating the State-, but 
with a greater bias toward assistential-
ism, as seems to have been the case in 
Sri Lanka. The least favourable initial 
pattern would be an economic struc-
ture oriented towards the production of 
durable consumer goods, whether for 
the domestic market or for export, 
under the control of transnational enter-
prises, and requiring continual imports 
of capital equipment, production inputs, 
technology and promotional innova-
tions. 
This last pattern, combined with 
heavy investment in urban luxury resi-
dential and commercial construction, has 
in recent years come to predominate in 
some of the larger Latin American coun-
tries and exercises significant influence 
in almost all of them. As previous papers 
in this series have emphasized, the resul-
ting dependent semi-development appar-
ently enhances material capacity to 
implement a basic needs strategy, but 
reduces the likelihood of political will to 
do so. Moreover, the material advantage 
over poorer, more predominantly rural 
countries is partly illusory. The endow-
ment of productive capital; the patterns 
of modernization of productive tech-
niques; the relatively extensive infra-
structures of power, transport and com-
munications; the concentrated urbaniza-
tion; and the elaborate, bureaucratized 
structures of education, health services, 
public housing and social security all 
have ambivalent roles. They are compati-
ble -some of the t ime- with relatively 
high rates of increase in GNP and with 
either a highly concentrated 'elitist' or a 
less concentrated 'mesocratic' distribu-
tion of incomes10 ; and they may possi-
bly be compatible with a combined 
assistential-repressive system for the re-
lief of critical poverty, but the weight of 
evidence indicates that they are n ot 
compatible with a strategy giving consis-
tent priority to the meeting of basic 
needs plus capital accumulation at levels 
that the economies should, in principle, 
be able to support. 
The character of the capital equip-
ment and technologies that have been 
introduced are clearly a large part of the 
problem —an automobile cannot be 
divided into twenty pieces to satisfy the 
basic transport needs of the masses, the 
construction techniques appropriate to 
modern apartment and office buildings 
cannot readily be adapted to 'basic' 
housing, and the manufacture of durable 
goods cannot revert to simple employ-
ment-spreading technologies. The atti-
tudes of the key social groups that 
benefit or hope to benefit from the 
prevailing style of development consti-
tute an even more formidable obstacle. 
University-educated intellectuals and 
planners who endorse a strategy for 
priority meeting of basic needs will 
probably resist its implications for them-
selves and their children. So will the 
leaders of the armed forces that will have 
to tolerate it, curb their own appetite for 
expensive innovations in military equip-
ment, and turn a deaf ear to appeals from 
groups whose expectations are threatened. 
10
 See Jorge Graciarena, "Types of income 
concentration and political styles in Latin 
America", CEPA L Review, N° 2, second half of 
1976. 
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If one supposes that continuing 
crises in the international order, chang-
ing stimuli from the world centres, and 
chronic inability in the national systems 
of semi-development to satisfy the 
expectations they have generated will 
periodically bring the question of 'basic 
needs' back to each national agenda, it is 
far from inevitable that the responses 
will be adequate. The social forces that 
are prepared to tackle the problem cannot 
Up to the present, the satisfaction of 
basic needs has been, at best, a by-
product of economic and political sys-
tems that have functioned according to 
their own laws. Men have had to serve 
the capitalist system, however irrelevant 
or even threatening to their own well-
being the services demanded and the 
resulting output might seem to be, in 
order to make the system erratically and 
intermittently serve them. If public 
policy tries to make the system function 
too directly on behalf of human welfare, 
curbing waste and potentially destructive 
activities, the system functions badly 
and human welfare suffers. If public 
policy eliminates an intolerable but 
essential component of the system, such 
as unemployment, the system responds 
with inflation. The workers serving the 
system come to welcome pollution of 
their environment and insist on rising 
production of armaments, even if the 
latter are demonstrably obsolete for 
defence purposes or are demonstrably 
intensifying the risk of mutual mass 
extermination. The paradoxical traits of 
expect a smooth, consensual, rationally-
planned transition, but they must struggle 
to keep the transformation from going to 
other extremes, such as doctrinaire solu-
tions hastily imposed on an uncompre-
hending population; promises and ges-
tures to satisfy the 'basic needs' concep-
tions of all sectors of opinion; distortion 
of the strategy to serve the interests of the 
technobureaucracy and substitute propa-
ganda for the recalcitrant reality. 
the functioning of capitalism have been 
exhaustively diagnosed since the nine-
teenth century, and while public policies 
have managed to raise the satisfaction of 
basic human needs to a degree that could 
not have been expected in earlier stages, 
the means have remained indirect, waste-
ful, and plagued by unwanted and un-
expected by-products.u The socialist 
systems have come closer to an egalita-
rian distribution of basic goods and 
11
 "Keynes did not want anyone to dig 
holes and fill them. He indulged in a pleasant 
daydream of a world in which, when invest-
ment had been kept at the full employment 
level for thirty years or so, all needs for capital 
installations would have been met, property 
income would have been abolished, poverty 
would have disappeared and civilized life could 
begin. But the economists took up the argu-
ment at the point where it had broken off 
before the war. When there is unemployment 
and low profits the government must spend on 
something or other —it does not matter what. 
As we know, for twenty-five years serious 
recessions were avoided by following this 
policy. The most convenient thing for a govern-
ment to spend on is amvaments. The military-
industrial complex took charge. I do not think 
3. 
Meaningful human activity and employment 
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services, but here too the demands of the 
system for accumulation and defence, 
and the suitability of central planning to 
accomplish some ends rather than 
others, have also left men the servants of 
the system, and the satisfaction of their 
basic needs more a means to their 
participation in production than an end. 
Proposals for basic needs strategies 
have commonly accepted that the needs 
must be satisfied by improving the func-
tioning of the economic system, natu-
rally with major reforms, but with the 
expansion of employment affording ade-
quate incomes still regarded as the cen-
tral mechanism for accomplishing the 
human purpose of development This is 
legitimate up to a point, but from the 
standpoint of the present paper it is 
essential to distinguish clearly the differ-
ent reasons why the expansion of 
employment is expected to enhance the 
satisfaction of basic needs, to question 
whether expansion must necessarily 
amount to maximization, and then to 
consider whether a different conception 
of meaningful human activity may not 
be required as a corrective to the subjec-
tion of human beings to systems that 
exact such a high price for their erratic 
and frustrating responses to needs. What 
people do and their satisfaction with 
what they do are just as important as 
it plausible to suppose that the cold war and 
several hot wars were invented just to solve the 
employment problem. But certainly they have 
had that effect. The system had the support not 
only of the corporations who made profits 
under it and the workers who got jobs, but also 
of the economists who advocated government 
loan-expenditure as a prophylactic against stag-
nation. . . . So it has come about that Keynes' 
pleasant daydream was turned into a nightmare 
of terror." Joan Robinson, "The Second Crisis 
of Economic Theory", The American Eco-
nomic Review, May 1972. 
what they receive and their satisfaction 
with what they receive. 
One cannot lightly propose a revolu-
tion in the work ethic as motor of 
development. Explorations along these 
lines risk intoxication with dreams of 
technological abundance and dreams of 
the painless emergence of a creative and 
altruistic new man. Nevertheless, for 
better or worse, the traditional carrot 
and stick of the economic systems are 
beginning to fall into discredit, and 
present levels of productive and inno-
vative capacity, even in semi-developed 
societies, should make it possible for 
these societies to begin to separate the 
obligation to work in 'gainful' activities 
from the right to satisfaction of basic 
needs. In Latin America, the exception-
ally low rates of participation in the 
labour force, the unproductive and pre-
carious character of much of the existing 
employment, the prospect of increasing 
pressures on the system from women 
and educated youth unable to find a 
satisfactory entry, make the achievement 
of conventionally-defined 'full employ-
ment' improbable12 and the quest for 
original solutions, giving due weight to 
all the social functions of employment, 
particularly urgent. 
The main functions of employment 
can be summed up as follows: 
(a) To produce goods and services and 
perform the social roles valued by 
the society; 
(b) To give individuals and families ac-
cess to incomes enabling them to 
satisfy their needs and wants; 
(c) To enable the individual to enter 
into relationships with the social 
12
 See Charles Rollins, "Population and 
labour force in Latin America: some simulation 
exercises", CEPAL Review N° 3, first half of 
1977. 
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order, interpret his interests in its 
maintenance or transformation, as-
sociate himself with a class or refer-
ence group, and acquire organiza-
tional ties; 
(d) To enable the individual to meet 
psychological needs for meaningful 
activity, self-realization, creativity, 
and status as family breadwinner. 
The extent to which a given employ-
ment situation fulfils all of these fun-
tions is inevitably uneven, whether ass-
essed from the standpoint of the indivi-
dual or from that of the society, and this 
unevenness is bound to be accentuated 
by rigidities and discontinuities in the 
labour market such as prevail in Latin 
America. Some occupations (e.g., that of 
the plantation worker) can be satisfac-
torily productive but wretchedly paid, 
offering the worker no opportunity to 
participate actively in the society and no 
sense of meaningful human activity. 
Other activities (e.g., the publicist's, cer-
tain bureaucratic posts) can be highly 
paid and conducive to active identifica-
tion with the society, but contribute 
little to a sense of personal achievement, 
and are irrelevant or negative in their 
relation to the meeting of basic needs. 
Further examples of incongruities in 
fulfilment of the basic functions of 
employment can readily be imagined. 
From the policy standpoint, the rela-
tive importance of these functions and 
the possibility of taking them into ac-
count as objectives varies according to 
the style and the level of development. 
At the most primitive level, the maxi-
mum contribution of all able-bodied 
persons to food production might be of 
overriding importance. At the other ex-
treme, in a highly-productive automated, 
egalitarian, post-industrial society the 
main social policy preoccupation might 
be with fulfilment of the fourth func-
tion. It can be assumed that any society 
that has achieved some degree of eco-
nomic diversification and modern state 
apparatus needs to and has some ability 
to pay attention to all four functions. In 
practically all Latin American countries 
increases in production of basic goods 
—or products that can be exchanged for 
basic goods- and income distribution 
through employment will have to remain 
central concerns of policy through the 
foreseeable future, but exclusive concen-
tration on these functions is not justified 
and might be self-defeating. 
In all modern societies up to the 
present remunerated employment has 
been the principal means of accom-
plishing the first two functions for the 
bulk of the population, and it is general-
ly also the most important means of 
accomplishing the last two —as far as 
they are accomplished at all. It is never 
the only means, however. The higher the 
level of productivity, the wider becomes 
the range of options for the role of 
employment in fulfilment of the func-
tions, but even in societies at very low 
income levels other means can be impor-
tant. Production of goods and services 
valued by a local group or by the State 
can be undertaken partly by volunteer 
labour, with proceeds going to the whole 
community rather than the direct parti-
cipants, or the authorities can draft la-
bour for public works. As economic 
growth proceeds the possibility of substi-
tuting capital and technology for labour 
increases, until in an automated produc-
tion system the relevance of the number 
of workers to the volume of production 
may practically disappear. In any society 
above a bare subsistence level part of the 
income generated through employment 
is redistributed through mechanisms of 
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family and community solidarity. As the 
level of productivity rises the feasibility 
of redistribution through public institu-
tions —social security, social services, 
social assistance— widens and such redis-
tribution comes to be viewed as both a 
human right and a political necessity. At 
a sufficiently high level of per capita 
income, it is possible to make family 
livelihood practically independent of 
gainful employment, through guaranteed 
annual income policies, or a 'negative 
income tax'. As to the objectives of 
integration into the social order and 
self-realization, the range of alternatives 
to paid employment is obviously wide, 
even in the poorer societies. To the 
extent that production and income dis-
tribution objectives require that most of 
the population spend a large part of its 
life in gainful employment, social parti-
cipation and self-realization naturally are 
hoped for from such employment, and it 
is a grave deficiency in the social system 
if most employment does not contribute 
to these ends. As leisure time increases 
and the proportion of the normal life-
span spent in employment shrinks, the 
main responsibility for meeting the two 
ends has to shift elsewhere, but no 
society has as yet found satisfactory 
alternatives. The malaise deriving from 
this deficiency in the high-income coun-
tries, particularly in regard to the aging 
retired population, is well-known. 
Optimal accomplishment of the four 
purposes of employment listed above 
does not in any society require either 
maximization of the time spent in em-
ployment by the whole population able 
to work, or maximum intensity of ef-
fort. In agricultural societies at low 
technological levels and with ample land 
for cultivation it may be essential that 
the whole population, including young 
children and the aged, contribute to the 
productive effort, but this effort has 
wide seasonal variations in intensity and 
includes tasks that are not at all onerous. 
The early stages of industrialization with 
relatively simple productive techniques 
have also involved extremely long work-
ing days and extensive use of child 
labour, but these features seem to have 
been dictated by the patterns of control 
of the means of production and by 
cost-cutting competition between manu-
facturers rather than by their indispens-
ability for maximum production. 
In any case, as economic growth and 
technological innovation proceed, and as 
skill requirements in practically all occu-
pational sectors rise, it becomes essential 
even in the interest of efficient produc-
tion that part of the potential labour 
force be excluded from employment or 
helped to escape from it, and that the 
working time of the employed popula-
tion be held well below the limits of 
physical endurance. In all modernizing 
societies a number of mechanisms appear 
through which the age span of the 
economically active population contracts 
at both ends, and the proportion of leisure 
time within the active age span increases, 
first in urban occupations, and later, as 
rural activities decline in relative impor-
tance and undergo technological and orga-
nizational changes, in the rural occupa-
tions also. The economic activity of 
women follows different trends, shrinking 
with the decline of agricultural and artisan-
type activities carried on by the family as 
an economic unit, then increasing with 
changes in family size and modern urban 
occupational opportunities, but in practi-
cally all societies covers a shorter average 
time-span and a smaller percentage of the 
relevant age groups than does the gainful 
employment of males. 
Ideally, the average age for entering 
employment should rise mainly because 
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the period of education lengthens and 
young people are thus better prepared 
for their future occupational roles. The 
average age for leaving employment 
should decline because the society is 
better able to support retirement pen-
sions and offer meaningful activities for 
the persons whose contributions to pro-
duction are no longer required. During 
the active span the contraction of the 
amount of time spent at work should 
respond to technological levels that per-
mit adequate production and incomes 
without interminable drudgery. It is 
obvious that even in the more homoge-
neous and welfare-oriented of the high-
income industrialized societies changes 
in employment patterns have not corre-
sponded smoothly to these ideals, and in 
the larger, more internally heterogeneous 
societies the changes have been conflict-
ive and frustrating enough to shake 
confidence in the future of the system. 
The system seems to demand from part 
of the labour force intense activity in 
order to earn incomes to provide a 
market for the goods it produces; and it 
renders superfluous other parts of the 
potential labour force, affording them, 
through the redistribution mechanisms 
of the State, a subsistence that may 
cover 'basic needs', but not the con-
sumption wants that the system insis-
tently promotes. It offers opportunities 
for meaningful human activities outside 
employment that are in practice accessi-
ble only to minorities. 
The bringing of a higher proportion 
of the working-age population into 
gainful employment is not legitimately 
an end in itself, although it is under-
standable that the State, unable to bal-
ance the different reasons for wanting 
employment and with few effective 
means of making the economic system 
function for human ends, may not be 
able to avoid treating it as such. Expan-
sion of employment is really a means to 
various ends and at the same time can 
interfere with the achievement of other 
socially valued objectives. In Latin 
America, the definition of realistic em-
ployment objectives and instruments is 
complicated by the co-existence, in in-
creasingly close contact and inter-action 
with one another, of widely differing 
technological levels, forms of organiza-
tion of production, and ways of life, all 
of them subject to continually changing 
and increasingly pervasive external in-
fluences and constraints. Completely dif-
ferent employment policies might be 
appropriate for specific population strata 
and specific sectors of production and 
provision of services, but the impracti-
cability of isolating the different strata 
and sectors from one another or from 
the external influences practically rules 
out the application of such policies.13 
Arguments for use by the govern-
ment of the policy instruments at its 
disposal to promote labour-intensive or 
'intermediate' techniques assume that 
the primary function of employment is 
Women's employment offers a partic-
ularly interesting example of complexities in 
determination of optimal participation in the 
labour force. Ideally, increased female partici-
pation should raise production, facilítate the 
performance of socially valued roles such as 
teaching and nursing, contribute to family 
income, enhance the capacity of women to 
participate on equal terms in social and political 
activities, and open to them wider opportu-
nities for self-realization and creativity. Under 
present conditions of the labour market and the 
social order, however, increased participation 
by women might mean low-wage competition 
for jobs now held by males, thus increasing 
visible unemployment and depressing family 
incomes in the poorer strata, while overburden-
ing women unable to escape from household 
maintenance, disrupting family organization, 
and reducing the quality of child care. 
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distribution of income rather than pro-
duction. Although the arguments com-
monly imply that labour-intensive tech-
niques are better suited to the produc-
tion of goods meeting basic needs, and 
that a basic needs production strategy 
would automatically expand employ-
ment, this seems to be only partly true. 
Latin American policy-makers have 
shown an almost instinctive reaction 
against recommendations of this kind as 
implying the acceptance of technological 
backwardness and renunciation of even-
tual parity with the world centres as 
industrial societies. The present paper 
arrives at a similar conclusion from a 
quite different viewpoint, rejecting the 
supposition that maximization of gainful 
employment, whether technologically 
advanced or otherwise, is the most pro-
mising path to a better future. 
The solution - a t the level of general 
ideas- lies in the complementation of 
employment objectives by objectives for 
meaningful human activity. That is, the 
social order should guarantee to all 
adults and youth a right to engage in 
activities meaningful to themselves and 
to the society and to the satisfaction of 
their basic needs, within limits set by the 
productivity of the economy, irrespec-
tive of gainful employment status. Pro-
duction would be carried on by the most 
efficient techniques available, given rela-
tive scarcities of capital, labour, and 
technical-managerial talents, with a per-
sistent effort to minimize routine drudg-
ery and maximize opportunities for cre-
ativity and pride in work. The whole 
adult population would encounter alter-
native combinations of activities match-
ing their interests and qualifications, and 
designed to enhance these qualifications 
while meeting societal needs and preserv-
ing freedom of choice: for example, 
voluntary labour combined with educa-
tion, ranging from preventive health 
work, child care, services to the handi-
capped and the aged, and cultural activ-
ities, to harvest labour, repairs to urban 
or rural infrastructure, and other manual 
work. As far as possible, the dividing line 
between employed and unemployed, 
intellectual and manual workers, 'pro-
ductive' work and household work 
would disappear. 
There is nothing new in the posing of 
such a Utopian objective for human 
societies, and the way to it is now less 
clear than it seemed to certain social 
thinkers of the nineteenth century. Ide-
ologically coherent forces in each natio-
nal society would have to struggle to-
wards its achievement, probably over a 
long period, keeping within bounds the 
inevitable temptations to opportunism 
and to doctrinaire rigidity, and measur-
ing progress in large part by the achieve-
ment of understanding and active partic-
ipation on the part of the masses. A 
strategy of this kind is obviously far 
from the intentions and the capabilities 
of the forces controlling the State in 
most countries at present, and also of 
the counter-elites that aspire to supplant 
them. However, once the dominant 
forces in any society take seriously the 
satisfaction of basic needs, and find 
inacceptable the assistential-cum-repres-
sive approach to the alleviation of pover-
ty, they can hardly avoid tackling the 
questions of meaningful activity and 
participation. 
The few national societies whose 
governments are making a serious effort 
to apply a basic needs strategy are also 
striving to universalize meaningful 
human activities, whatever terms they 
may use and however wide the gap 
between aspirations and realities. The 
effort can hardly stop short of the kind 
of egalitarian, participatory, non-capital-
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ist society proposed by the Bariloche America's meeting of basic human needs 
Foundation as a condition for Latin through its own efforts.14 
4. 
Participation 
The discussion now enters an area in 
which the gap between the ideal and the 
real is so wide, the temptation to evasive-
ness so strong, and the rehashing of 
verbal good intentions so distasteful that 
one approaches it almost with despair of 
saying anything new and useful. 'Partic-
ipation' for present purposes means 
having "influence on the decision-
making process at all levels of social 
activity and social institutions".15 'Par-
ticipation' is not coterminous with 
'meaningful activity'; it is at least theo-
retically possible for the individual to be 
meaningfully occupied from his own 
standpoint and from that of the values 
of his society, without participating in or 
even being aware of the choices made by 
dominant forces in the society ; and 
participation as a citizen obviously does 
not guarantee that the individual will 
find meaningful activity in the greater 
part of his life that is spent in other 
pursuits. Nevertheless, in societies such 
as those of Latin America it is reasonable 
to suppose that neither will advance very 
far without support from the other. 
14
 Catastrophe or New Society? A Latin 
American World Model, Ottawa, International 
Development Research Centre, 1976, pp. 
24-26. 
15
 Carlo Geneletti, "The concept of parti-
cipation: an evaluation", CEPAL/DRAFT/DS/ 
125, August 1975. 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso has 
summed up, at the end of a harsh 
diagnosis of the shortcomings of certain 
channels of participation in Latin 
America up to the present, the reasons 
for continuing to insist on it as an 
indispensable component of any accept-
able image of the future. He fears that in 
default of the reactivation of the masses 
and without an anti-bureaucratic ideolo-
gy based on individual responsibilities 
and awareness of social needs, the leap 
from what he calls 'patrimonialism' to 
technocratic corporativism may land the 
poor Latin Americans in a reproduction 
of the barbarous life of the 'concrete 
jungle' that so appalled the socialists of 
the nineteenth century. Unless society is 
revivified by means of vigorous social 
drives for political participation and the 
definition of new kinds of controls 
applicable to enterprises, to cities, to the 
State and to the basic social institutions, 
there will be a risk that a horrifying new 
world may be created which will replace 
the city -once the forum of liberty- by 
Alphavilles endowed with every requisite 
for reproducing, through mass media 
technology and apathy, a 'frozen 
society' style.16 
16
 See Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Autori-
tarismo e Democratizaçao, Rio de Janeiro, Paz 
e Terra, 1975, p. 163. 
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The International Labour Office has 
directed its attention to the same prob-
lem in more instrumental terms, in dis-
cussing implementation of its proposed 
'basic needs' strategy: 
"A weakness of many formulations 
of national development policy is 
that they are divorced from political 
reality. They tend to assume the 
existence of an autonomous State 
which pursues a generalized national 
interest as articulated by its tech-
nicians, independent of political con-
straints. . . . In order to put a plan 
into action account must be taken of 
the size and organization of the 
interest groups and regional coali-
tions which would benefit or lose 
from the proposed policies and the 
consequential changes in social status 
and political influence. . . . Because 
of the divergences between interest 
groups and within classes, govern-
ments often have some degree of 
flexibility in initiating policy and 
strategy changes. Their ability to 
implement them, however, is clearly 
related to their ability to promote 
consensus, weaken groups likely to 
lose from them and organize support 
from those who would benefit. 
. . . The main prerequisite for the 
effective implementation of this ap-
proach would thus appear to be an 
effective, decentralized and demo-
cratic administrative structure to 
translate policies into decisions and 
action, and mass participation in the 
development process by the poverty 
groups."17 
This statement scarts from a realistic 
formulation of the political problem and 
17
 Employment, Growth and Basic Needs: 
A One-World Problem, op. cit., pp. 64-66. 
ends by proposing three acts of faith: (a) 
that the proposals of the technicians 
interpret the national interest correctly; 
(b) that the State has a sufficient 
measure of rationality and autonomy to 
seek a political strategy making the 
proposals viable; (c) that decentralized, 
democratic decision-making and mass 
participation, once mobilized, will flow 
in channels indicated by the proposals 
and not in others. The statement 
exemplifies the aspiration to reconcile a 
technocratic utopia with a participa-
tionist utopia and the vacillation between 
the two that recurs throughout the explo-
rations of 'another development', in-
cluding the present text.18 The tech-
nocratic utopias imply that every prob-
lem has one optimal solution; participa-
tion should consist in the education and 
mobilization of the population to under-
stand and apply this solution. The par-
ticipationist utopias imply that various 
satisfactory solutions can emerge from 
the creativity of the people who need 
the solutions; that the flowering of 
collective creativity through the exer-
cising of free choice is central to 'another 
development'; that technicians should 
take part as helpers without delusions of 
their own infallibility; and that in the 
last analysis people have a right to be 
wrong. Both utopias are ambiguous in 
their consequences for human welfare; 
neither is likely to impose itself over the 
long term, and it might be disastrous if 
one or the other did so; the tension 
between them seems to be necessary and 
permanent in the efforts of human intel-
ligence to impose human purposes on 
the future evolution of society. 
18
 Jose Medina Echavarria, in "Las pro-
puestas de un nuevo orden económico interna-
cional en perspectiva" (CEPAL/Borrador/DS/ 
148, November 1976), pp. 20-28, penetratingly 
discusses this question. 
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Extremely varied forms and tactics 
of participation have appeared in Latin 
America and been hailed by one sector 
of opinion or another as the key to 
authentic development. They range from 
national electoral democracy through 
mass interest-group organizations to 
local community organization and 
workers' management.19 At present, the 
shortcomings of all these forms are more 
evident than their achievements. Some 
have failed with cruel consequences for 
the masses drawn into them; others have 
persisted with extremely ambiguous 
consequences for development or egalita-
rian social justice; still others have re-
mained stunted and localized. Two 
essentially elitist alternatives have gained 
strength from these shortcomings: ma-
nipulated mobilization backed by repres-
sion and strictly limited to objectives 
laid down by the dominant forces; and 
terrorist tactics intented to make the 
functioning of the repressive social order 
impossible. The fact that so many insti-
tutional forms of participation have been 
on the stage for some time and have left 
behind disillusionment, fear and sup-
pressed resentments stands in the way of 
imaginative new efforts. The participa-
tion-minded planners and the masses 
both have reason to be wary. The inven-
tion of radically different approaches is 
unpromising. The national societies will 
continually have to return to a range of 
well-known institutions and techniques 
in the hope that they can be made to 
function better than hitherto. Even the 
technobureaucratic régimes recurrently 
try to use the same instruments for their 
own purposes and encounter some of the 
same stumbling-blocks as have their pre-
decessors. 
19
 See Social Change and Social Develop-
ment Policy in Latin America, United Nations 
The shortcomings of the participa-
tory institutions and initiatives can be 
summed up in a way that suggests an 
agenda for doing better: 
(a) At the national as well as the 
local level they have been superimposed 
on political and economic structures 
with which they were incompatible. 
These structures might work badly with-
out participation, but with it they could 
hardly function at all. The recurrent 
outcome has been that the participatory 
efforts have mobilized their enemies 
more effectively than their friends, have 
set in motion defence mechanisms (from 
the flight of capital to the discharge of 
workers and eviction of peasants) that 
hurt primarily the new participants, and 
eventually have been swept aside in a 
conjuncture of demoralization and con-
fusion ; 
(b) The social groups enhancing their 
capacity to participate have naturally 
focused on consumption, whether in the 
form of housing, cheap food and trans-
port, credit facilities for instalment 
buying, education or health services. The 
responses of the State have followed the 
line of least resistance, meeting the 
demands that involved least direct cost, 
and least opposition from other groups. 
The argument that participation would 
lead to mass understanding of the need 
for voluntary restraint of consumption 
in the interest of accumulation has 
proved inapplicable in the face of 
obvious waste and luxury consumption 
on the part of others backed by the 
whole array of stimuli of the 'consume-
rist' style of development; 
publication, Sales N°: E.70.II.G.3, chapter 
XIX, "Popular participation in development"; 
and Marshall Wolfe, El Desarrollo Esquivo, 
Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1976, 
chapter V. 
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(c) The various forms of participa-
tion and the participants themselves have 
focused on the extraction of benefits 
from the State or on neutralizing 
adverse State actions, even when this 
might seem alien to the logic of the 
specific form of participation -as in the 
case of workers' management and co-
operatives. Thus, participation has meant 
increasing dependence, bureaucratiza-
tion, and channels for control by the 
State, even when the initiative has come 
from social groups relatively hostile to 
the State. The well-known expansion of 
university-educated middle strata seeking 
posts in bureaucratic agencies charged 
with participatory activities or offering 
themselves as intermediaries on the side 
of the newly participating groups has 
favoured this trend; 
(d) The participatory mechanisms 
have been able to incorporate the lowest 
strata of the national populations - the 
poor, oppressed, marginalized, or sub-
proletarian— only to the extent that 
their participation has been manipulated 
or neutralized by co-optation of leaders.20 
Such participation has been quite unable 
to exercise the function of counter-
vailing power, strengthening the govern-
ment's disposition to undertake 'basic 
needs' strategy in the teeth of opposition 
from better-off groups, in the way envis-
aged in the ILO statement quoted above. 
Much the same thing applies at the local 
20
 Carlo Geneletti has argued (in "The 
concept of participation: an evaluation", op. 
cit.) that participation means access to political 
power; those who have least power obtain least 
from the S t ate as well as the s ocial and 
economic system; thus the degree of participa-
tion can be measured by the benefits accorded 
by the State to each group. Since the State 
represents existing power relationships its 
efforts to mobilize those who lack power can 
be hardly more than pretence. 
level; 'community development' pro-
grammes have as often given the locally 
powerful new ways of exploiting the 
poor as they have given the poor a 
stronger voice in the community. Some 
peasant movements and the well-known 
'spontaneous' organizations of urban 
groups for land seizures, provision of 
community infrastructure, and negotia-
tions with the authorities are partial 
exceptions, usually temporary but recur-
rent, and of considerable promise as 
'seeds of change' if radically different 
overall styles of development eventually 
emerge. Up to the present, where the 
forces controlling the State have per-
ceived such movements as a serious 
threat, they have been repressed without 
much difficulty; more often, the co-
optation of the leaders and the limited 
and defensive objectives of the members 
turn them into legitimized and basically 
conservative neighbourhood organiza-
tions or mechanisms for control and 
relief of tension through assistentialism.21 
Such participation has been assimilable 
as long as it has been localized, not 
calling for major changes in the access of 
the disadvantaged groups to employment 
and income. The national structures have 
21
 A paper on "Popular Participation for 
the Improvement of the Human Environment 
in Marginal Settlements", prepared by the 
Social Development Division of the United 
Nations Secretariat for the United Nations 
Conference on Human Settlements, Vancouver, 
Canada, May-June 1976, contains a good deal 
of information on these organizations, along 
with strong arguments for their positive role, 
given a minimum of governmental tolerance 
and aid. However, it also makes clear the 
ambivalent traits of official intervention; the 
dominance of self-serving leaders (caciques) 
integrated into the national political system; 
and the tendency for individuals who exploit 
the settlements (shopkeepers, etc.) to be most 
active organizationally. 
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been able to withstand a considerable 
broadening and diversification of the 
groups actively competing for higher 
incomes and status, with ambiguous con-
sequences for the prevailing style of 
development, but have fallen into serious 
turmoil or hardened into repression at 
any prospect that the masses were about 
to enter the national political game in an 
organized and autonomous way. The 
result has sometimes been not only the 
violent exclusion of the masses but also 
the barring from effective participation 
of the middle and lower-middle strata 
that seemed to have achieved a perma-
nent and secure share in decision-making. 
Latin America confronts two kinds 
of polarization, both increasing in scale 
with industrialization, agricultural 
modernization and population growth, 
that should be equally daunting to the 
proponents of technocratic and partic-
ipationist utopias: 
(a) Between the population groups 
already sharing to some degree in the 
fruits of economic growth, in access to 
'modern' or 'formal sector' employment, 
in post-primary education, etc., whether 
or not the power structure and the 
dominant ideology permit them to par-
ticipate politically; and the groups that 
have gained little or nothing, that partic-
ipate politically either not at all or 
precariously and intermittently through 
local organizations, clientelism, or elec-
toral support of populist movements. 
This kind of polarization, and the strate-
gies proposed to overcome it, have been 
recurrent themes of the present paper; 
(b) Between urban agglomerations 
on a scale unknown in the world up to 
the present, and highly dispersed rural 
settlements, both undergoing continual 
changes in patterns and functions. At the 
one extreme, the metropolitan area of 
Mexico City will have nearly 14 million 
inhabitants by 1980, and in the unlikely 
event that present trends continue that 
long, nearly 32 million by 2000.22 Sao 
Paulo will have about 12.5 million in 
1980, and could have 26 million in 
2000; while the corresponding figures 
for Rjo de Janeiro are 10 million and 19 
million; for Lima 5 million and 12 
million; for Bogotá 4.4 million and 9.5 
million. While the other present megalo-
polis of the region, Buenos Aires, can 
expect a relatively low rate of growth, 
and only two other cities (Caracas and 
Santiago) are likely to pass the 5 million 
mark by 2000, the total number of cities 
with more than one million inhabitants 
will be 25 in 1980 and probably around 
50 by 2000. At these and smaller city 
sizes one can expect considerable diver-
sity in rates of growth and in functions, 
depending on changes in technology, in 
transport and trade networks, and in the 
consumption patterns (including con-
sumption of leisure time) imposed by 
the styles of development: specialized 
industrial centres, agricultural frontier 
marketing centres, mineral exploitation 
centres, political-administrative centres, 
and resort centres. In all of these urban 
types, in-migrants will greatly out-
number natives; only certain provincial 
capital and 'museum cities', of small 
consequence in the overall trends, might 
be able to maintain demographic and 
social structural continuity. The forms 
22
 These figures are taken from "Trends 
and Prospects in the Population of Urban 
Agglomerations, 1950-2000, as assessed in 
1973-1975", prepared by the Population Divi-
sion, United Nations Secretariat (ES AP/P/WP. 58, 
21 November 1975). The CEPAL/HABITAT/ 
C1DA project, "Problemas Sociales del Ambien-
te Humano en America Latina" is elaborating a 
classification of settlement types drawing on 
the same information. See also Desarrollo y 
cambio social en America Latina, Cuadernos de 
la CEPAL, N° 16, Santiago, Chile, 1977. 
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taken by political participation outside 
the huge multifunctional agglomerations 
will depend in part on the kind of 
population attracted by the specialized 
functions. At the other pole, the rural 
and small town population will doubtless 
continue to grow slowly in some coun-
tries, becoming stationary or declining in 
others, but will be far from static in 
spatial distribution, social structures, and 
life styles. It will be increasingly domi-
nated by urban influences, but will mani-
fest peculiar combinations of isolation 
and horizontal mobility, gaining access 
to some features of modernization but 
not others. While the population in the 
larger centres will continue to have a 
disproportionate representation of 
young adults, outmigration will continue 
to leave this age group under-re presen ted 
in the countryside. 
As long as current styles of develop-
ment prevail, the greater part of the 
'beneficiary' population will be found in 
the cities, generally constituting a ma-
jority, while the greater part of the rural 
population will remain marginalized or 
'critically poor', although the rural share 
of the total marginalized population will 
continue to fall, and the relative import-
ance of 'beneficiaries' within the rural 
population may rise.23 Both urban and 
rural populations will continue to be 
polarized, with large marginalized minor-
ities in the first and large beneficiary 
minorities in the second. (However, in 
the countries in which the rural popula-
tion still outnumbers the urban, a good 
23
 The terms 'marginalized' and 'beneficiary' 
are used here for convenience, as emphasizing 
the aspects most relevant to the discussion of 
the well-known split between losers and 
gainers in the prevailing styles of development; 
the real divisions in urban and rural class 
structures are obviously a good deal more 
complicated. 
many of the urban agglomerations, in-
cluding some of the larger ones, may 
become dumping-grounds for a subprole-
tariat expelled from the land but still 
mainly dependent on agricultural wage 
labour, as seems to have happened in some 
parts of Brazil, to such an extent that the 
marginalized part of their population 
becomes a majority.)24 In the urban 
agglomerations, both the beneficiary and 
the marginalized population will be con-
tinually on the move as older neighbour-
hoods change their class composition or 
are eradicated by the expansion of com-
mercial and industrial activities, and as 
transport networks encourage or discour-
age different patterns of urban sprawl. In 
the rural areas also, changing demands 
for crops and for labour, the opening-up 
of new lands, and the disintegration of 
traditional tenure systems will keep both 
the beneficiary and the marginalized 
population in movement. 
Under these conditions, with the 
population groups segregated in different 
life styles by their income levels, but in 
continual contact with each other, in 
continual spatial movement and continu-
ally growing in numbers, a techno-
bureaucratic State and ubiquitous mass 
communication media under the control 
24
 See Paul Israel Singer, "Implicaçoes Eco-
nómicas e Sociais da Dinámica Populacional 
Brasileira", Estudos sobre a Populaçao Brasi-
leira, CEBRAP, Caderno 20, Sào Paulo, 1975, 
for a comment to the effect that the urbaniza-
tion of a part of the agricultural labour force 
brought in its train the unification of the urban 
and rural labour market. The new in-migrants 
settled on the outer fringes of the cities, in 
wretched living conditions, and were available 
at a low price for the capital invested both in 
agriculture and in urban activities or construc-
tion. See also Franklin de Oliveira, A Tragedia 
da Renovaçâo Brasileira, Minas Gérais e Sào 
Paulo: a Miseria dentro do Progressa, Rio de 
Janeiro, Civilizaçâo Brasileira, 1971. 
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of the State might well become the only 
effective unifying factors, ushering in the 
kind of anomic society depicted by 
Cardoso in the quotation above. How-
ever, the consolidation of centralized 
technobureaucratic controls over such a 
population may not in the long term 
prove any easier than the consolidation 
of the decentralized and democratic 
mechanisms for decision-making called 
for by 'another development'. One can 
expect mutations of interest-group orga-
nizations, local community defence orga-
nizations, and religious as well as politi-
cal movements offering security and 
hope to emerge continually, react in the 
most diverse ways to 'future shock', and 
confront continual efforts at control and 
manipulation from the national centres of 
power. Probably none of these forms of 
participation will actively involve the 
majority, either in the beneficiary or the 
marginalized population, at any one 
time. One can expect the nuclear family 
to continue to struggle with the impossi-
ble task of socializing children for a 
future in which most of them will have 
to form new families in settings com-
pletely different from the 'family of 
orientation'.2S One can expect the mass 
communication media and the educa-
tional systems to transmit messages even 
more diverse and contradictory than at 
present, partly under the influence of 
the 'seeds of change' transmitted from 
the central industrial or post-industrial 
societies, partly under the influence of 
domestic crises of consumerist develop-
ment and incapacity of the labour 
market to absorb the output of the 
educational systems. Governmental 
25
 See Carlos Borsotti, "Notas sobre la 
familia como unidad socioeconómica", Revista 
Paraguaya de Sociología, N° 36, May-August 
1976. 
efforts to regiment these messages in the 
interest of a determined style of develop-
ment may curb the diversity but proba-
bly not eliminate it for very long. 
One comes back to the not very 
original propositions that progress toward 
authentic participation in decision-
making will require: (a) simultaneous 
progress toward a style of development 
giving priority to basic needs and 
meaningful human activity; (b) vitality 
and adaptability in all the organizational 
forms of participation now on the stage, 
none of them likely to become panaceas, 
all of them susceptible to distortions; (c) 
the marriage of an intellectual élite 
consciousness and a mass consciousness, 
both of which are now fragmented and 
far from accepting the full implications 
of'another development'. The attractive-
ness of idealized versions of the Chinese 
style of development, even in sectors 
that have no sympathy for the ideolo-
gical basis and the political tactics asso-
ciated with the style, suggests a widening 
intellectual awareness of what must be 
done, but no workable idea of how to go 
about it (and who is to go about it) in 
the Latin American circumstances of 
dependent semi-development. 
The future can be expected to bring 
certain harsh lessons insistently and 
repeatedly to the attention of all strata 
of the population. If conclusions con-
sistent with the values of'another devel-
opment' are gradually to permeate 
popular consciousness, the minorities 
that are already reaching these conclu-
sions must undertake a task of conscien-
tization without dogmatism, insisting on 
the long term non-viability of present 
trends, risking some exaggeration and 
over-simplification, but trying to stay 
well this side of catastrophism, and 
maintaining sufficient historical con-
sciousness to remember that the future 
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will always be largely unexpected, that 
the challenges to human societies are not 
so much overcome as transformed into 
new challenges, that 'development' or 
'history' does not move from a 'begin-
ning' to an 'end' in utopia or disaster, 
and that inefficiency and injustice in the 
functioning of a social system are not 
sufficient proofs that it cannot continue 
to function. 
Participatory development requires 
new ways of thinking throughout the 
national society, and these new ways are 
possibly coming to birth in a confused 
and contradictory fashion. The present 
popularity of speculations on the future, 
the controversy over 'another develop-
ment', the proliferating international 
campaigns on the human environment, 
habitat, population, poverty, hunger, 
sexual and racial equality are all contri-
butions to this process, however mis-
directed or evasive some of their 
manifestations may seem. It is clear that 
popular consciousness, giving at least 
partial assent to militant minorities, is 
now setting limits to the functioning of 
the centralized industrial societies that 
some of the dominant forces in them 
find deeply alarming -and that inspire 
the latter, among other things, to devise 
counter-utopias demonstrating that the 
only way to achieve the objectives of the 
campaigns is unfettered economic expan-
sion. Similar currents are agitating tech-
nobureaucratic and academic circles in 
the rest of the world, torn between 
anxiety to preserve the previous myth of 
development; suspicion of the motives of 
'anti-growth', conservationist and re-
distributionist campaigns emanating from 
the world centres; and awareness that 
somehow their thinking and their policies 
must incorporate the new objectives. 
We know much less about the real 
reception of the newer preoccupations in 
different strata of the populations of the 
peripheral countries, although generaliza-
tions are plentiful. The upper and middle 
strata cannot avoid some awareness of 
the questions through the mass media, 
but probably are even less disposed to 
draw conclusions relating to their own 
life-styles than are their counterparts in 
the central countries; their immediate 
concerns are to broaden their entry into 
the consumer society and influence the 
State to ward off threats from below. It 
is reasonable to suppose that the masses 
of the population are also preoccupied 
by immediate problems of livelihood and 
security, but that their material expecta-
tions, even in the unevenly modernized, 
semi-developed societies, remain modest. 
The new preoccupations may add some-
thing to the egalitarian ferment that has 
long been at work among them, but the 
consequences can only be guessed at, 
particularly in settings in which rapid 
advances in popular mobilization have 
been followed by sudden exclusion. One 
can suppose a widespread anxiety, only 
partly conscious, for some meaningful 
interpretation of what is happening, 
allowing the individual and family to 
relate themselves to an image of the 
future, something more satisfying than 
the ceaseless struggle to make ends meet. 
The response, however, may take messi-
anic or xenophobic as well as more 
conventional political lines. 
Earlier papers in these series of 
explorations of styles of development 
have criticized the use of the term 'we' 
by self-appointed intellectual spokesmen 
for the impoverished masses.26 One 
should be particularly wary of attri-
buting a common awareness, uniform 
26
 See Marshall Wolfe, "Approaches to 
development: Who is approaching what? ", 
CEPAL Review, N° 1, first half of 1976. 
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aspirations, and capacity for organized 
action to broad population categories: 
the poor, the youth, the women, the 
workers, the peasants, etc. Some of these 
categories constitute social classes with a 
bent to self-identification and common 
action; others may be more real, as 
sources of self-identification, to the eye 
of the observer dealing with statistical 
aggregates, than to the supposed mem-
bers. The preceding paper discussed 
the limitations of 'poverty' as a frame of 
reference for group self-identification, 
and a monograph by Aldo Solari has 
ridiculed over-generalization on the aspi-
rations of 'youth'.27 Individuals falling 
into such broad categories may shift 
among half a dozen contradictory self-
identifications, or have no self-identifica-
tion disposing them to participate in 
group action, but declarations deriving 
from the international movement toward 
'another development' commonly assert 
that such broad categories are making 
demands on society that only minorities 
among them have dreamed of. As a 
corollary, it has been proposed that such 
categories name representatives to sit 
with government delegates in interna-
tional conferences to make their 
supposed demands heard. One can justi-
fy such reification of broad population 
categories as a tactic designed to create 
the group consciousness that it assumes 
already to exist, a deliberate self-fulfilling 
prophecy. This is undoubtedly happening 
on a significant scale, and is one of the 
ways in which variants on the idea of 
'another development' are penetrating 
popular consciousness. It is natural for 
27
 Aldo Solari, "Algunas reflexiones sobre 
la juventud latinoamericana", Cuadernos del 
ILPES, Series II, N° 14, Santiago, 1971. 
the movements convinced that 'some-
thing must be done* to project on the 
social groups for which they feel particu-
lar empathy their own values and aspira-
tions. As a guide to political action 
depending on the real readiness of broad 
population categories for mobilization, 
however, the attitude can be disastrously 
misleading. First, it can obviously lead to 
over-confidence, defeat, and disillusion-
ment, if the vanguard assumes a mass 
following that is non-existent, only 
superficially interested, or really pre-
occupied by questions that the vanguard 
has not understood. Second, the supposi-
tion of common perceived interests 
within broad population categories 
masks real and perceived conflicts of 
interests within the category, such as 
those between different kinds of 'criti-
cally poor' and 'relatively poor'. The 
result is likely to be an alliance between 
external spokesmen —governmental or 
otherwise- and the most articulate ele-
ments in the population category, 
excluding or manipulating the remainder. 
There can be no substitute for 
humility and realism in the élite con-
sciousness that tries to serve the 
consciousness of the masses, and these 
qualities have been in short supply up to 
the present. The cause of participation 
has suffered from excessive manipula-
tiveness, on the one hand, and from 
over-confidence in uniform mass readi-
ness to participate on the other. It has 
been associated with excessive confi-
dence in the problem-solving ability of 
the State. This in turn leads us to the 
topic of self-reliance, even more vener-
able and ambiguous than that of par-
ticipation, and now coming back to the 
foreground after years of relative 
neglect. 
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5. 
Self-reliance 
The theme of self-reliance, like the other 
broad guidelines to 'another develop-
ment' discussed in this paper, has re-
appeared as a dialectical reaction to the 
preponderance of its opposite in the real 
trends of economic growth and social 
change. The terms in which it is im-
posing itself as a radical criticism of 
these trends show interesting parallels 
between the international, the national, 
the local-community, and the family-
individual spheres of action and inter-
action. The relationships of dominance 
and dependency have become so frustra-
ting to major forces in central as well as 
peripheral countries, and the possible 
consequences of continually rising indeb-
tedness, continually ramifying activities 
of transnational enterprises, and con-
tinual shocks from the economic and 
political rivalries of the world centres 
have become so ominous that régimes of 
many different complexions are seeking 
means of enhancing their autonomy, 
tailoring their plans to their internal 
resources, if only for the purpose of 
strengthening their bargaining power in 
the negotiations over a new international 
economic order. Meanwhile, the inability 
of the developmentalist-welfare State to 
satisfy all the demands made on it is 
generating a reaction on the part of 
national political leaderships, aiming or 
pretending to divest the State of some of 
its responsibilities through controlled 
decentralization, as well as on the part of 
different sectors of the public, from 
which rises a chorus of partly contra-
dictory accusations against the fiscal 
voracity of the State, its paternalism, 
bureaucratization, failure to solve prob-
lems, and inability to provide efficient 
services or sufficient jobs. These re-
actions are evident in what might seem 
to be model welfare states. They should 
be particularly acute in semi-developed 
countries that have taken over the full 
accoutrements of the modern State 
without the command over resources, 
administrative capacities, or social con-
sensus needed to make them function 
for the general welfare. In national so-
cieties at all levels of development, the 
resulting frustrations and fears have 
given renewed vigour to very diverse 
i de ol ogical and religious currents 
—cultural-nationalist, liberal, communi-
tarian, anarchist- that for diverse 
reasons reject centralization, regimenta-
tion, paternalism, assistentialism, 'mass 
society', and other contraries to self-
reliance. Meanwhile, the momentum of 
the forces making for national entangle-
ment in the web of dependency and 
human entanglement in the web of 
technobureaucracy continues, checked 
at some points and gaining even more 
strength at others. 
The following quotations sum up the 
positive reasons for insisting on self-
reliance: 
"If development is the development 
of man, as an individual and as a 
social being, aiming at his liberation 
and at his fulfilment, it cannot but 
stem from the inner core of each 
society. It relies on what a human 
group has: its natural environment, 
its cultural heritage, the creativity of 
the men and women who constitute 
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it, becoming richer through exchange 
between them and with other 
groups. It entails the autonomous 
definition of development styles and 
of life styles. . . . it does not ask the 
question 'how much can we get 
through exchange', but 'how much 
can we produce ourselves or with 
others'. Thus, the basis is laid for a 
search for new resources, for uti-
lizing known resources in new ways 
and, sometimes, for questioning the 
need for the product. . . . A self-
reliant society is able to stand up 
better to crises: it is self-confident 
and has the means to sustain its 
dignity."28 
"Since this entails trying many dif-
ferent paths, so that the law of 
diversity may operate and there may 
be a good chance that one is going in 
the right direction (that is, will not 
end up in a blind alley), a practical 
conclusion inmediately becomes 
evident: it is necessary to be nation-
alist, or at least 'regionalist'. 
In point of fact, acceptance of a uni-
versal culture means, from this point 
of view, putting all the eggs in one 
basket: a risk that should not be run, 
for although it may somewhat in-
crease the likelihood of gain, it makes 
the cost of losing infinite. Moreover, 
giantism reduces flexibility and the 
capacity for adaptation to unexpected 
changes."29 
28
 See What Now? Another Development, 
op. cit., pp. 34-35. 
The positive case for self-reliance 
thus links it to creativity and participa-
tion; it assumes that neither the national 
society nor the individual will reach their 
full potential without making their own 
decisions and taking the consequences. 
The Dag Hammarskjôld Report couples 
this with the supposition that all so-
cieties will eventually pool their self-
reliance in a highly co-operative and 
interdependent world order responding 
to common values. The Varsavski formu-
lation is somewhat closer to the survival 
of the fittest; it is up to each society to 
demonstrate that its own path is a 
valuable contribution to a human future 
of continued diversity and unending new 
challenges; if some cannot meet the 
challenges, a benevolent world order is 
not going to save them. 
Both quotations hint at the negative 
case. Crises are going to come ; the 
greater the training in self-reliance the 
greater the probability that the society 
or group or individual will surmount 
them. The national society can reason-
ably count on a certain amount of 
international aid if its leaders set out to 
transform the style of development; it 
can also expect a certain amount of 
obstruction. It will be able to use the 
one and cope with the other to the 
extent it reduces its vulnerability and 
increases its self-sufficiency, whether 
alone or associated with others in a like 
position. 
2
 Translated from Oscar Varsavski, Pro-
yectos nacionales, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Peri-
feria, 1971, p. 228. 
